Journal of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 14

Issue 8

Article 3

8-28-2013

Social Mechanisms for Causal Explanation in Social Theory
Based IS Research
Chrisanthi Avgerou
London School of Economics, c.avgerou@lse.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais

Recommended Citation
Avgerou, Chrisanthi (2013) "Social Mechanisms for Causal Explanation in Social Theory Based IS
Research," Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 14(8), .
DOI: 10.17705/1jais.00341
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais/vol14/iss8/3

This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of the Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic
Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Journal of the Association for Information
Systems

Research Perspective

Social Mechanisms for Causal Explanation in Social
Theory Based IS Research
Chrisanthi Avgerou
London School of Economics
c.avgerou@lse.ac.uk

Abstract
In this paper, I argue for the development of explanatory theory in IS research. I critically examine ways of
explaining IS phenomena, identify alternative epistemological approaches used in the social sciences, and
point out the significance attributed to causality. I focus in particular on the development of explanation in
process IS research that draws from social theory. I introduce the notion of social mechanism and suggest that
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more complete and novel causal explanations of IS phenomena.
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Social Mechanisms for Causal Explanation in Social
Theory Based IS Research
1. Introduction
Explanatory theory addresses why and how observed phenomena occur, and thus helps us to better
understand the world. However, the nature and structure of explanatory theory and the way it is
developed have attracted relatively little attention in the IS field. Articles on the principles and criteria
of good theory rarely address explanatory theory as such; instead, they tend to conflate explanatory
and predictive theory (i.e., theory intended to answer questions of whether a phenomenon will occur
in the future or in other contexts) (Bacharach, 1989; Weber, 2012). Many aspects of good theory in
general are relevant to explanatory theory. But there are distinctive features and issues associated
with explanation, the most prominent of which concerns the importance attributed to causality in the
propositions of the theory (Gregor, 2006). Explanation, according to contemporary epistemology,
requires unravelling causal processes that bring about theorized phenomena (Markus & Robey, 1988;
Pentland, 1999; Tsoukas, 1989; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).
I assume that IS theories are not constructed de novo: they do not spring out of data, even if an
empiricist methodology such as grounded theory is pursued (Carroll & Swatman, 2000; Suddaby,
2006). At the very least, IS theory development draws on theoretical perspectives that provide
ontological and epistemological assumptions regarding human action and the relationship between
technology and society. Such theoretical assumptions frame the researcher’s perception of
phenomena that merit explanation (Garfinkel, 1981) and the choice of entities and relationships
through which the explanation is constructed. Hence, my study of explanatory theory focuses on a
stream of IS research that constructs its investigation by drawing general assumptions about the
nature of human action and about the relationship of technology and society from contemporary
sociology and the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS) (Bijker & Law, 1992;
Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Latour, 2005; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). To strengthen the
explanatory capacity of such research, I propose developing causal claims by tracing social
mechanisms that bring about IS phenomena.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I present current thinking about the role of
general theory and causality in the development of explanation. I draw from epistemology and the
literature of IS and organizational studies to argue for the development of causal propositions in the
premises of general theoretical perspectives. I examine how explanation is framed by general theory
and how causal claims can be constructed. In Section 3, I take a critical look at the way IS
researchers who draw from social theory frame their objects of study and how they develop
propositions to explain them. I observe that such research tends to form explanation by refining
concepts of the researchers’ chosen theories of action and technology. Empirically derived insights
enrich and adjust the foundational concepts but do not add new explanation propositions beyond
those suggested by the concepts of the general theoretical framing of the research. In Section 4, I
introduce the concept of social mechanism as a building block for causal process theory. I discuss
three aspects of social mechanisms research: the analytical level at which social mechanisms can be
drawn, social mechanisms as a way to construct causal phenomenon-specific and context-dependent
explanation, and the way social mechanisms can be traced to form explanatory theory. In Section 5, I
suggest a shift of social theory-based IS research effort toward the development of causal process
explanatory theory by tracing social mechanisms that bring about IS phenomena. I also summarize
the strengths and weaknesses of social mechanisms theory. In the conclusion, I point out that the
changes I suggest will require reviewers and journal editors to have an open attitude toward research
that breaks from established tacit norms.

2. Explanatory Theory for IS Phenomena
Philosophers of science distinguish two ways of constructing explanation: by fitting observed
phenomena in general theories (covering law explanation) and by identifying their underpinning causal
associations and processes (Brandon, 1990; Salmon, 1998). In recent decades, there has been a shift
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towards the latter (Scriven, 1975; Vayda & Walters, 2011) . Influential sociologists have questioned the
capacity of all-embracing theories to provide satisfactory explanations of social phenomena, and have
suggested that researchers narrow their focus in order to explain delineated phenomena such as social
mobility or employee behavior (Merton, 1967; Mills, 1959). Theories of bounded relevance and validity
that explain specific social phenomena have come to be known as ―middle-range‖ theories.
More recently, similar concerns about deriving explanations from general theories have surfaced in
several social science fields, including organizational studies and management. These concerns are
echoed in the debates about the overreliance of IS and organizational studies on theories imported
from more-established disciplines (Grover, Lyytinen, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2008; King & Lyytinen, 2006;
Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011; Truex, Holmström, & Keil, 2006). Oswick et al. (2011), for example,
observe that imported theories in the field of organizations and management studies are often
general theories of a high level of abstraction, which are ―domesticated‖ by refining and extending
them to fit the phenomena studied in the field. Davis and Marquis (2005) critique the tendency in
organizational studies to derive explanations from general theoretical paradigms such as transaction
cost economics, resource dependence theory, and institutionalism. They argue that these theories
cannot address the variety of effective forms of organizing that have been observed in different
countries or the emerging new forms of organizing in the context of globalized economic activity.
Rather than searching for a substitute grand theory of organization, Davis and Marquis suggest a
research approach that develops theory appropriate for contemporary ways of organizing by
empirically unravelling the causal paths that form observed organizational phenomena (Davis &
Marquis, 2005, p. 340). Nevertheless, Davis and Marquis understand the empirical search for causal
explanation to be theoretically grounded; they advocate the development of empirically derived
causal explanation in the perspective of institutional theory.
Suggestions for complementing general theory-driven perspectives with phenomenon-specific causal
explanations are congruent with views of explanatory theory that have emerged in contemporary
epistemology. Salmon (1998, p 77) argues for explanation derived from a combination of general
theory and analysis of observed phenomena to work out the causal processes that generate them. In
short, in the context of the debate about whether explanations should be derived from general theory
or causal reasoning, the position that seems to be gaining acceptance is that the two approaches are
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. This is a position that I consider pragmatically
appropriate for IS theory and, on this premise, the questions I explore below are how causal
explanatory theory is articulated with general theory and what form causal explanation takes.

2.1. Identifying the Object of Study with Reference to General Theory
Any study of social phenomena deals with entities that are ascribed various value-laden meanings by
their human participants and the researchers (Bacharach, 1989). A major aspect of identifying and
delineating a research object in IS research is the theory about society and technology adopted by
the researcher. Such theory guides, either explicitly or implicitly, the choice of some focal entities
rather than others, the meanings given to them, the associations, and the constructs studied by the
research (Weber, 2012). Consider two different ways in which IT use has been explained in IS: by
theories focusing on individual intention (Vankatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) and by theories
considering users as social actors (Lamb & Kling, 2003). The former is founded on a view of human
action as stemming from individuals’ calculated behavior; it seeks to identify factors affecting the
intentional behavior of independently acting individuals. The latter is founded on a view of action as
being shaped in relation to social context; it seeks to identify how individuals come to use technology
in situations of social interactions that are constrained and enabled by their institutional setting.
Research that seeks to explain IT use on the basis of behavioral intention may consider social
conditions that influence human behavior, but preserve the fundamental focus of the explanation on
independently acting individuals (Vankatesh & Morris, 2000). Research that assumes the social
1
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embeddedness of IT use (Rowlands, 2009; Watson-Manheim & Bélanger, 2007) seeks to explain it by
focusing on human actors making sense of technology and using it in their interactions in normsladen social collectives.
Often, research of IS phenomena involves more-complex theoretical choices than a foundational
theory of action and technology. Theorists draw from a continuum of highly abstract foundational
theories that explain the world we live in, theories of bounded generalization that apply to phenomena
2
deemed similar, and more narrowly bounded, phenomenon-specific theories .
Consider, for example, how Wasko and Faraj (2005) theoretically frame their research for explaining the
use of electronic networks by professionals. Working in the general theoretical perspective of IT users
as social actors, they draw from several conceptually compatible social theories of action and
knowledge. These include the theory of knowledge creation in communities of practice, and a theory of
collective action centering on the notion of social capital. Wasko and Faraj’s theory building has a
relatively narrowly demarcated research object, focusing on the use of electronic networks that support
knowledge sharing among professionals. In their research, existing theory not only cocneptually shapes
the research object but also provides hypotheses for answering the focal question of why professionals
share their knowledge when they participate in electronic networks. Following an approach commonly
used in IS research (see, for example, McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Sykes, Venkatesh, &
Gosain, 2009), they construct relevant hypotheses by assembling existing relevant knowledge
compatible with their theoretical perspective. Subsequently, their empirical research seeks to test the
validity of the proposed hypotheses. In this way, Wasko and Faraj bring existing knowledge at various
levels of abstraction to bear on explaining the new and still poorly understood phenomenon of ITenabled social networking. An alternative approach, which I propose in this paper, is the empirical
construction of new explanatory propositions in conceptual frames derived from social theories.

2.2. Constructing Causal Explanation
I turn now to examine the form of causal explanation. The most thorough discussion of causality in
the IS literature is Markus and Robey’s (1988) article on the causal structure of theory on IT and
organizational change, which outlines the two forms causal relationships may take: variance and
process causal models. Variance models identify causes as antecedent conditions for observed
effects, which establishes ―X causes Y‖ relationships that are empirically validated through statistical
methods. Such models do not elaborate on how X causes Y. In contrast, process causal models
reveal the logical link between initial conditions and outcomes by tracing causes in sequences of
actions and events that connect them.
Causality is also acknowledged by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) in their analysis of the ontological
and epistemological aspects of IS research approaches. Positivist research seeks to establish ―unidirectional cause-effect relationships that are capable of being identified and tested via hypotheticdeductive logic and analysis‖ (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p 9); interpretive research constructs
explanations that are causal, but not in the uni-directional sense and not for the same purpose as the
positivists: ―Interpretive researchers posit circular or reciprocally interacting models of causality, with
the intention of understanding actors’ views of their social world and their role in it‖ (ibid).
Notwithstanding this early attention to the issue of causality, in the IS field there has been relatively
little discussion of causal explanation. Causality is rarely explicitly articulated. Consider how causality
is implied rather than explicitly established in Wasko and Faraj’s (2005) explanation of sharing in
electronic networks. Their hypotheses describe relationships between dependent and independent
variables that are implicitly causal, stating, for example, that specific cognitive characteristics of
individuals make them prone to contribute to networks of practice. The causal reasoning of such
hypotheses may or may not have been established in the theoretical work on cognitive capital that
Wasko and Faraj draw from, but, in their research, it is taken for granted rather than being
investigated. Their empirical study aims at statistically establishing the strength rather than the causal
logic of the relationship between professionals’ cognitive characteristics and sharing behavior.
2
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Causality is also discernible in interpretive IS case studies. A good example is Davidson’s (2002)
interpretive study on instability in information requirement determination (IRD), which builds on the
socio-cognitive concept of technology frames (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Davidson discusses an IRD
destabilization case in terms of shifting between two salient socio-cognitive frames of the IS under
construction: business value of IT and IT delivery strategy. Causality is alluded to in the case study
narrative that describes events and conditions of the project that led to the shifting of frames and
consequently brought about project failure. Davidson makes no causal claims. She presents her
contribution as a process model that ―draws analytic attention to the dynamics and possible
consequences of frame shifts‖ (Davidson, 2002, p. 352).
One reason for interpretive researchers’ reluctance to refer to their explanatory concepts as causes of
the phenomena they study is their awareness that these particular concepts never fully capture the way
socio-technical phenomena are brought about. Interpretive research holds a perspective of IS
phenomena as emerging from the interaction of human actors and technology. Simple single-directional
causal relations cannot account for the interpretive flexibility of actors encountering technology. The
processes shaping IS phenomena and their consequences are dynamic and largely unpredictable
3
(Klein & Myers, 1999; Markus & Robey, 1988; Orlikowski, 1996; Walsham, 1995, 2006) . Giddens,
whose version of structuration theory has been influential in interpretive IS research, considers causal
statements important because they underpin theoretical generalization. He cautions, nevertheless, that
causal relationships in social scientific theory are inherently unstable because they are subject to actors’
reasoning in response to the intended and unintended consequences of their actions (Giddens, 1984).
Thus, the development of explanation in interpretive IS research faces the difficulty of searching for causal
processes of meaning making and action in the context-dependent unfolding of dynamic interactions of
people with technology. Causal processes cut across levels of analyses between the individual and the
collective, connecting the interpretations and actions of individuals with the norms of the collectives by
which they are influenced. They are often recursive rather than linear. The development of such
explanatory theory is not a trivial task. Taking this challenge seriously, I examine these issues below in
more detail in relation to the interpretive IS research stream that draws from social theory.

3. Explanation in IS Research that Draws from Social Theory
There is a relatively long history of developing socio-theoretical explanations of IS phenomena.
Davenport (2008) traces it to the ―social informatics‖ research tradition in the US (Sawyer & Tapia,
2007) and the ―socio-technical‖ research in the UK (Avgerou, Ciborra, & Land, 2004; Dutton, 1999;
Mumford, 2006). Early contributions include the explanatory perspective of the ―web of computing‖
model by Kling and Scacchi (1980) and Kling and Scacchi (1982), and the calls for expanding the IS
research landscape with social theory and philosophy at the 1984 conference of the IFIP 8.2 series
(Fitzgerald, Hirschheim, Mumford, & Wood-Harper, 1985). Such research became more prominent in
the 1990s with a number of influential publications (Bloomfield, Coombs, Knights, & Littler, 1997;
Jones, 1999; Monteiro & Hanseth, 1996; Nardi, 1997; Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey, 1991;
Star & Ruhleder, 1996; Walsham, 1997). A stream of theory building efforts, that I refer to in this paper
as ―social theory IS research‖, has thus been founded on the premise that action is shaped by social
context and, in turn, that action shapes its context (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1977;
Giddens, 1984). This research also draws from theories of technology from the burgeoning STS field
(Bijker & Law, 1992; Law, 1991; MacKenzie, 1996).
Social theory IS research is not a monolithic theory body. There are significant differences among the
foundational theories of action and technology that it drawns on. Debates concern both the
interpretation of these theories (Jones & Karsten, 2008, 2009; Orlikowski, 1992, 2000; Poole, 2009),
3
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espousing anti-causality philosophical positions on society and knowledge. Interpretive research in IS does not produce only thick
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pragmatist world views that are at ease with causality (Gross, 2009; Mingers, 2004; Shapiro, 2005).
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and the relative merits of the resulting IS theory (Kallinikos, 2004). Moreover, IS theorists creatively
draw on theories at different levels of abstraction, blending middle range theories of the sociology of
organizations with philosophical positions on the ontology and epistemology of action and
technology—see, for example, the way Ciborra and his associates combine phenomenology with
actor network and other sociological theories to explain the formation of corporate information
infrastructures (Ciborra & Associates, 2000).
Despite such differences and blending, it is reasonable to look for common core characteristics in
the theory building effort of this stream. Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011) argue that theory
development in fields of knowledge tends to follow norms and common behaviors that, borrowing
the metaphor of Goffman’s scripted behavior on the theatre stage, they call ―epistemic scripts‖.
Scripts for knowledge production underpin the theory-building research effort and the presentation
of this effort in academic texts. Particular scripts become tacit knowledge for a community of
researchers, forming institutionalised conventions of academic knowledge production. Epistemic
scripts influence not only what knowledge researchers produce but also what academic readers,
journal editors, and reviewers recognize as legitimate ways of building theoretical claims and what
they see as valid theoretical contributions. In Section 3.1, I examine the way theoretical
contributions are constructed in social theory IS research.

3.1. General Theoretical Framing and the Construction of Explanatory
Propositions
To examine the epistemic script of social theory IS research, I searched six IS journals (MISQ, ISR,
I@O, JAIS, EJIS, ISJ) for papers published since 2000 that include the terms structuration, actornetwork theory (ANT), practice, situated action, and/or embeddedness in the abstract. Although such a
search cannot capture the full spectrum of social theory IS research, I believe it produced a
representative sample of papers. This search identified 42 papers that, at closer inspection, I found to
indeed present research grounded in structurational theories of action and technology. In a nutshell, in
this sample, the most prevalent strategy for explanatory theory building is combining existing theory and
empirical observation in process analysis of case studies. Researchers frame a phenomenon they seek
to explain in terms of the concepts of their selected general theories, which they subsequently refine
4
and extend with insights gained from the case studies to explain their focal phenomenon .
To better understand this pattern of theory construction, I took a closer look at research on ITmediated organizational knowledge that is founded on a cluster of theories known as the ―practice
lens‖ (Elingsen & Monteiro, 2003; Levina & Vaast, 2005, 2008; Vaast & Walsham, 2009). The practice
lens is underpinned by theories of action with a social constructionist epistemology and versions of
phenomenology (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Gherardi, 2000; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Sandberg &
Tsoukas, 2011). It is cast in juxtaposition to technical/rational approaches that explain organizational
phenomena as being the result of calculated and planned decision making. The fundamental premise
of the practice lens is that organizational phenomena, such as innovation, are shaped through
people’s enactment of tasks in the everyday life of their work place.
Research from the perspective of practice has formed a distinctive, and to some extent cumulative,
explanatory theory-building endeavor with respect to IT mediated organizational learning and
knowledge management (Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Orlikowski’s (2000, 2002) publications on ITmediated organizational change and on knowing and learning have played a foundational role for the
5
practice lens in this IS research subfield . Building on Giddens’ structuration theory and on ideas
about the interaction of people and technology from cognitive anthropology with phenomenological
underpinnings (Hutchins, 1996; Lave, 1988; Suchman, 1987), Orlikowski elaborates through case

4
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This is a pattern of theorising similar to the epistemic script of ―evolution‖ and ―differentiation‖ that Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011)
found to be prevalent in the organizational theory field. Boxenbaum and Rouleau argue that theorists often incorporate in their
proposed theory concepts and ideas from the broader literature and from empirical observation in a bricolage manner, but they do
not account for this process in the presentation of the research.
According to Google Scholar, these two publications have been cited more than 4000 times as of March 2013.
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studies highly abstract concepts, such as technology-in-practice and organizational knowing. These
concepts are widely used in subsequent IS research that adopts the practice lens.
Many researchers extend general theories of practice to address specific issues of knowledge in
organizations. For example, Levina and Vaast (2008) engage with the phenomenon of global
information technology outsourcing and address issues of collaboration in IS projects outsourced to
offshore locations. Their research illustrates and refines the theoretical perspective of collaboration in
practice, using mostly Bourdieu’s theory of practice. They thus suggest that boundaries of
communication that disrupt collaboration are due to status differences among participants that result
from differential accumulation of various forms of social capital.
The pattern of theory building exemplified in Levina and Vaast (2008) is as follows. The object of
study is framed by combining concepts from foundational social theories of practice such as Giddens’
structuration theory, or ―domesticated‖ versions of them (Oswick et al., 2011) such as Orlikowski’s
theory of organizational knowing in practice. The research involves interpretations of case studies
through these framing theory concepts. Analysis both demonstrates the validity of the practice lens
concepts developed in prior research and adjusts them to construct conceptual refinements suitable
to the specific issues or social settings under study (Levina & Vaast, 2005; Vaast & Walsham, 2009).
This way of theory building is significantly different from Wasko and Faraj’s (2005) research, which
derives propositions entirely from existing theory and uses empirical evidence to test it. In Orlikowski
(2000, 2002) and Levina and Vaast (2008), theoretical propositions are constructed by interplaying
existing general theory and empirical insights. However, the explanations developed are not new
concepts: they convey the insights of a chosen general practice theory to the particular case under
investigation. This epistemic script does not seek to empirically derive entirely new understandings of
how a phenomenon is brought about. It does not generate suggestions ―of relationships and
connections that had previously not been suspected‖ (Weick, 1989, p 524).
The possibility of creating surprising new explanations in social theory IS research is demonstrated in
Bowker’s (1997) study of knowledge development in organizations. While conceptually positioned in
the structurational theoretical tradition, Bowker’s explanatory effort departs from the epistemic script
of refining original concepts, and constructs a surprising novel theoretical contribution. His research
highlights the significance of forgetting, and identifies in a case study two ―strategies‖ through which
forgetting happens: clearance and erasure (Bowker, 1997, p 114). In the last part of his paper (though
only briefly), Bowker discusses the theoretical contribution of forgetting in relation to existing
theoretical positions on knowledge, classification systems, and the development of information
infrastructure. He notes that his suggestion is complementary to other explanations that stem from
the social construction of knowledge and the practice lens.
It is not clear how Bowker (1977) identified forgetting as a significant part of the phenomenon of
organizational knowledge. The empirical study seems to have played an important role in his
research, but he does not elaborate on how he identified forgetting as part of organizational knowing;
processes such as forgetting are not possible to observe. The importance of the researcher’s intuitive
leap notwithstanding, I suggest that phenomenon-specific explanatory propositions can be
constructed by tracing the causal paths of actions and events that lead to observed outcomes, and, in
Section 3.2, I more specifically examine the form causality takes in social theory IS research.

3.2. Causality
The practice lens IS stream manifests the reluctance of interpretive research to develop explicit causal
propositions on the dynamic, circular, and reciprocal links through which outcomes such as learning and
knowing are achieved. For example, Orlikowski’s (2000) rich case narrative of IT and organizational
change indicates a number of detailed causal processes, such as users’ efforts to fulfil the career
development criteria of their organization or their work adjustments according to their perceived match
of technology to the task at hand. Orlikowski discusses several organizational conditions, processes,
and consequences, but she is careful to only point out the different forms these may take in different
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cases, rather than assembling causal propositions about their relationships. The richness of her case
study insights is channelled to support and substantiate the concept of technology-in-practice, which
calls to mind a general causal process of how organizational change happens. Orlikowski’s aim to
develop a general theoretical perspective of practice suitable for IS research is entirely valid and
justifiably influential in the social theory IS subfield. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of general
theory refinement as the epistemic script in research framed by theories of practice has constrained the
development of context and technology-specific causal explanation.
One example of social theory IS research in which causal processes become clearer is Goh, Gao,
and Agarwal’s (2011) study that seeks to explain successful implementation of health information
systems in hospitals. This research is framed by the concepts of adaptive structurational theory
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Markus & Silver, 2008) and the theory of organizational routines (Feldman
& Pentland, 2003). The empirical analysis develops a model of a virtuous circle formed by three
categories of causal processes, associated with functional affordances, symbolic expressions, and
agents’ actions. The model comprises causal explanation in the form of mechanisms that bring about
observed outcomes. These mechanisms are more than refinements of general theory concepts. They
are fairly new insights derived from the interplay of theory with empirical data.
In short, there are different ways that explanation of IS phenomena can be constructed in process
research that draws from social theory. Table 1 shows a summary of the main characteristics of the
examples I drew above from the literature. In this table, Wasko and Faraj (2005) exemplifies research
that draws from existing theory to form propositions of relationships with implicit causality and tests them
statistically. Levina and Vaast (2008) exemplifies the epistemic script that sheds light on IS phenomena
by drawing explanatory concepts from existing theory and refining them in case studies. Bowker (1997)
exemplifies research that is theoretically clearly framed and derives new explanatory concepts from a
case study. Goh et al.’s (2011) research centers on the empirical search for social mechanisms in a
general theoretical perspective. The strength of their approach in comparison to the approach taken by
Levina and Vaast (2008) is the potential for identifying phenomenon-specific causal processes beyond
those directly implied by the general theory concepts. I explore this type of explanation in Section 4 by
introducing the notion of social mechanism and I point out its relevance to IS research.
Table 1. Examples of Explanation Construction in Social Theory IS Research
Role of general theory
in forming explanations

Role of empirical
study in forming
explanations

Source of hypotheses for
variables and their
Wasko and relationships. Provides an Tests variance
Faraj (2005) implicit causal logic
hypotheses.
underpinning the
hypotheses.
Demarcates object of
study and provides
Levina and
general explanatory
Vaast (2008)
concepts with implicit
causality.

Demonstrates the
merits of and
refines general
theory concepts to
explain issues in a
IS phenomenon.

Causal structure

Theory features: breadth and
novelty

Multiple relationships
of variables within the
chosen theoretical
perspective.

Bounded to a specific phenomenon
(professional knowledge sharing on
electronic networks); builds on
existing theory to explain a new
phenomenon.

Explanation by one
implicit causal
process path.

Bounded to an IS phenomenon
(collaborative knowing in
outsourcing); limited theoretical
novelty in the form of adjustment of
existing concepts.

Bowker
(1997)

Implicitly frames a
conceptual research
space.

Source of a new
explanatory concept Single concept
in the implicit
explanation of implicit
theoretical
causality.
perspective.

Abstract and of relevance to a broad
category of organizational contexts.
High theoretical novelty.

Goh et al.
(2011)

Explicitly frames the
research space and
demarcates object of
study.

Traces causal paths
within the
theoretically framed
research space.

Bounded to an IS issue (success of IT
implementation) and organizational
context (hospital); novel detailed
phenomenon-specific explanation.

Multi-causal process
model; nevertheless
inherently partial and
incomplete.
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4. On Social Mechanisms
In a very general sense, mechanisms are sets of entities and activities that produce change from an
initial state to observed outcomes (Bunge, 2004; Gross, 2009; Hedström, 2005; Hedström &
Swedberg, 1998b; Martin, Weisenfeld, & Bekmeier-Feuerhahn, 2009; Mayntz, 2003; Steel, 2004).
Social mechanisms have received a great deal of attention in philosophy and across the social
6
sciences as building blocks for the construction of causal explanations of social phenomena
(Bhaskar, 1986; Falleti & Lunch, 2009; Little, 1995; Reskin, 2003; Steel, 2004; Van de Ven & Poole,
7
1995). They reveal causal processes that explain how a social phenomenon is created .
Gross (2009) summarized the main points of agreement and disagreement in the debates on what
constitutes satisfactory social mechanisms-based explanation. There seems to be agreement that:
a) Social mechanisms are processes that link causes and effects
b) Social mechanisms comprise sequences of action and/or events unfolding in time
c) Social mechanisms invoked to explain unique events form the basis for propositions of
causal processes with a certain degree of generality, and
d) Social mechanisms research constructs explanation by analysing a phenomenon to
identify constituent entities and causal relationships in processes of actions and events
that generate its observed outcomes. In social theory IS studies, the entities of social
mechanisms comprise individuals, collectives, artefacts, or their hybrids, such as web
based business firms. Social mechanisms may show how actors came to form specific
meanings of an IS situation, why they acted in a particular way, or why their actions and
interactions with technology took a particular path in relation to their context.
Social mechanisms abound in IS theory but, like causal claims more generally, they are rarely
explicitly identified and mentioned as such. Examples of social mechanisms invoked in IS
explanations without acknowledging them as such are the coercive, mimetic, and normative ―forces‖
of institutionalization in research that draws from the neo-institutionalist theory (Mignerat & Rivard,
2009). Many social mechanisms are discernible in the publications I examined in the previous
section; for example, knowing in practice (Orlikowski, 2002), cognitive framing of technology
(Davidson, 2002), and forgetting (Bowker, 1997).
Since social mechanisms already exist in IS explanations, the reader is likely to be wondering at this
point why it matters that they are not mentioned as such and what the value is of recognizing them
explicitly. My argument is that explicit identification of social mechanisms makes the constituent parts
of causality surface to form explanatory theory of complex social phenomena. The tracing of social
mechanisms in empirical studies can lead to an approach of theory development in the social theory
IS research tradition that departs from the prevailing epistemic script of forming explanation by
refining foundational theory concepts. It is a methodology for the development of multi-causal
8
explanation in IS research .
In Section 4.1, I examine three contentious aspects of social mechanisms research that theorists
need to be aware of (Gross, 2009): the question whether social mechanisms explanation should
break down phenomena to the behavior of individual actors or can involve collective social entities,
6

7

8
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Mechanisms are found in the physical sciences as well as the social sciences. While most theorists in the social sciences use the
term social mechanisms to refer to mechanisms underpinning social phenomena, many just refer to ―mechanisms‖. The term
―causal mechanism‖ is also often used as a synonym to social mechanism. The concept ―generative mechanism‖ of critical realism
(Mingers, 2004) refers to social mechanism in the context of social phenomena. I understand Pentland’s (1999) term ―generating
mechanism‖ to refer to social mechanism, too.
The most comprehensive account of the development of a theory by tracing social mechanisms is McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s
(2001) book Dynamics of contention on social movements. Another example is Gaventa’s (1980) explanation of quiescence in a
miners’ community that faced conditions of deprivation.
An example of constructing multi-causal explanation in the form of social mechanisms can be found in Avgerou (2013).
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issues regarding the generalization of social mechanisms derived to explain specific cases, and
questions regarding how social mechanisms can be traced.

4.1. The Type of Entities that Form Social Mechanisms
Ultimately, all social phenomena result from actions of individuals, whether calculated, spontaneous,
or habitual. However, individual actors are embedded in social systems and social phenomena are
subject to opportunities and constraints from these systems. A fully analytical explanation of a social
phenomenon in terms of individuals’ actions is understood to involve three types of elementary
mechanisms, bridging levels of analysis (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998a):
1. Macro-to-micro mechanisms explaining how individual action is enabled or
restricted by the social context in which it is embedded; this involves theories that
link a social structure or context with the behavior of individual actors. Such
examples include Goffman’s (1963) theory of individuals’ behavior in public places
and Ciborra and Lanzara’s (1994) explanation of innovation in software
development in terms of the influence of an organization’s social relations (its
formative context) on the behavior of programmers.
2. Micro mechanisms explaining individual action; these are psychological or socialpsychological mechanisms showing how specific desires, beliefs, and opportunities
lead to specific actions (Hedström, 2005). A well known example of micro
mechanisms in IS research is the explanation of people’s intention to use IT in terms
of their perception of its usefulness and ease of use (Davis, 1989).
3. Micro-to-macro mechanisms explaining how the actions of individuals produce an
observed collective outcome, such as market models in neoclassical economics.
An example in IS research is Devaraj and Kohli’s (2003) explanation of the
economic performance impact of IT in hospitals in terms of employees’ usage of
available IT systems.
Some scholars in analytical sociology advocate creating rigorous explanatory theory at the level of
individual action and interaction by focusing on the motivations of intentional individuals confronting
opportunities for action (Hedström, 2005). Nevertheless, they acknowledge that efforts to identify
causal mechanisms at the level of individual action are confronted with large and complex causal
chains. Identifying mechanisms at the individual level of analysis may not be an effective or feasible
way of explaining social phenomena. Mechanisms in terms of collective actors are therefore accepted
as a methodological strategy to cope with theoretical complexity. In this argument, a mixed-level
analysis (Markus & Robey, 1988) is accepted on the pragmatic grounds that it is unrealistic to trace
the causal explanation of complex social phenomena in elementary mechanisms at the level of
individuals’ psychology and behavior.
A stronger argument in favour of mechanisms that involve collectives is made on ontological grounds.
An analogy from the sciences may be helpful to clarify why it is not necessary or indeed desirable to
trace micro-to-micro explanatory mechanisms when trying to explain social phenomena. While all
biological phenomena may be traceable down to chemical processes, a great deal of effective
explanation of phenomena studied by the life sciences is constructed at the level of higher units of
analysis of ―cells‖ and ―organs‖. Similarly, social phenomena may be explained in terms of collective
action rather than in terms of the psychological properties and processes of the individuals involved.
In other words, macro-macro social mechanisms are justified on the ontological grounds that social
reality is stratified, with each level exhibiting emergent properties and sustained by relationships that
are logically valid only at that particular level. For example, the explanation of phenomena associated
with national societies may require social mechanisms that refer to government institutions. Thus, the
reduction of social phenomena to the aggregate effect of intentional individual actors has been
criticised in both the broader social sciences (Archer & Tritter, 2000; Gross, 2009; Mills, 1959) and IS
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(Lee, 2010; Sarker & Valacich, 2010) for ignoring the importance of social wholes and therefore often
leading to misleading conclusions.
The different positions in this debate on the types of social mechanisms necessary to explain a social
phenomenon stem from the researchers’ adopted theory of action (Gross, 2009). Theories that
assume the social embeddedness of human action, such as the practice lens, consider collectives
such as ―communities of practice‖ as necessary components of explanatory propositions to account
for the enabling and constraining relationships of social structure. More generally in social theory IS
research, collective entities and processes unfolding in a social context are likely to be seen as
playing an important role in the generation of aggregate effects from the actions of individuals.

4.2. Causality and Generalization of Social Mechanisms Based Explanation
The social mechanisms approach to explanatory theory develops a causal reconstruction of a
phenomenon by identifying the processes through which an observed outcome was generated (Bunge,
2004; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Mayntz, 2003). In variance research, social mechanisms
provide the logical link required to explain statistically generalizable relationships among variables, thus
avoiding mistaken claims of causality known as the confounders problem (Steel, 2004). This is the role
of mechanisms in research such as that of Mithas, Tafti, Bardhan, and Goh (2012) and Lee, Barau, and
Whinston (1997), where the identification of mechanisms is a first stage for the design of empirical tests
of the relationship between variables. In causal process theory, which is relevant to social theory IS
research, mechanisms and processes form a continuum. While mechanisms are processes in their own
right, they concatenate with other mechanisms into larger process theories.
There are significant differences between the variance and process approaches regarding the way
mechanisms-based explanation forms theoretical claims. In the former, a mechanism identified by
existing theory or in a case study is the basis for the formation of a hypothesis, the validity of which is
tested statistically to support a general explanatory claim. In the latter, theory development is not
separated from theory testing; an explanation is constructed by process tracing which generates
evidence both for the occurrence of a mechanism and the validity of the causal logic of this
mechanism (Steel, 2004; Suddaby, 2006). The objective of the research is to elicit a causal logic in
the occurrence of a phenomenon. The existence of the mechanism and the variations it may take in
different contexts can be investigated further in comparative case studies.
In process models, a social mechanism does not determine a straightforward cause-and-effect
relationship. Social mechanisms identify intermediate events and action that contribute to the
transition from an initial state A of a phenomenon to an observed outcome B, but they are always
partial explanations of B. The transition from A to B may depend on conditions other than the initial
state of A, and may involve multiple influences in the broader context of the transformation from A to
B. In different contexts, a particular social mechanism may produce different effects. In other words,
social mechanisms do not entail one-to-one cause and effect relationships between social entities or
events. Merton (1968) clarifies this point regarding the self-fulfilling prophesy mechanism as an
explanation of a financial crisis: individuals worried about the possibility of a banking crisis and
initiating a run on their banks contribute to the crisis becoming reality. But whether a run on the bank
will happen, and the significance of any such run for the financial sector, depend on many other
processes, actions, and reactions, such as measures taken by the regulator of an economy to
reassure depositors.
Therefore, social mechanisms in process theory are indeterminate explanations—they cannot predict
the outcomes of certain initial conditions. In different contexts, a particular social mechanism may not be
triggered and opposing social mechanisms may alter the final outcome. As Markus and Robey (1988)
point out, the causes identified in process theory are insufficient for the occurrence of outcomes. They
do not support claims of universally held relationships and their predictive capacity is limited.
Generalizing social mechanisms-based process explanations falls in the category of generalization
from description to theory identified by Lee and Baskerville (2003), which is achieved by deriving
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abstractions from the specifics of a case (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss,
1967). A major challenge in constructing social mechanisms-based explanatory theory is how ―to
identify social mechanisms specific enough to have explanatory value for particular observed
outcomes or relationships, but at the same time general enough to apply in different empirical fields‖
(Mayntz, 2003, p. 254). As Falleti and Lynch (2009) put it, social mechanisms-based theory is derived
from the specificity of particular cases by identifying portable concepts that operate in similar cases in
different contexts, without, nevertheless, determining particular outcomes.
Some mechanisms are cast at a high level of abstraction and are broadly applicable; others are much
more specific and apply to only certain organizational settings. The extent of generalization of social
mechanisms theory is delineated by the boundaries of the research object. It also depends on the
extent to which the concepts capturing the proposed social mechanism as a causal process are
transferable to other phenomena to reveal the logic of a transformation of an initial state towards an
outcome. If the object of research and the context of a case study are clearly delineated, a reader will
be able to see the limits of generalizability of the proposed theory and judge the relevance of the
proposed social mechanisms to other cases. Nevertheless, even with careful delineation of
boundaries, the fundamental indeterminacy of social mechanism explanations makes law-like
generalization impossible and statements of their probabilistic regularity precarious.

4.3. How Social Mechanisms are Identified
Social mechanisms at the organizational and societal levels of analysis tend to be traced in narrative
accounts of processes (Abbott, 2001; Abell, 2004; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; George &
Bennett, 2005; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2008; Pentland, 1999). However, narrative analyses in
process research do not necessarily develop social mechanism-based causal theory. Research that
follows the process approach often describes processes as sequences of events in time but does not
identify how they bring about observed outcomes. For example, while Sabherwal and Robey’s (1995)
analysis of IS development narratives identifies patterns of systems development actions, thus
challenging the staged life cycle model, it does not identify any causal logic for the sequences they
found. Similarly, Newman and Robey’s (1992) process model of user-analyst relationships comprises
antecedent conditions, types of events, and the nature of analyst/user relationships outcomes in an
information systems project, but does not elaborate any causal logic that explains the way events
lead to outcomes. In both these examples, theory is constructed by identifying and measuring
variables for statistical predictions rather than offering social mechanisms-based explanations.
Pentland (1999) makes a distinction between narratives that present the ―surface structures‖ of a
process and narrative analyses that identify ―deep structures‖ that underlie the sequence of events,
which he calls ―generating mechanisms‖: ―to describe a process, one needs event sequences. But to
explain a process, one needs to identify the generative structures [social mechanisms] that enable
and constrain it‖ (Pentland, 1999, p. 722). Surface structures are found in the stories told by the
actors interviewed by the researchers and in the text produced by the researcher to describe
ethnographic observations. It is more difficult to identify the mechanisms that drive the process and
explain observed outcomes. Searching for processes that explain outcomes, Pettigrew (1997)
suggests, is likely to reveal multiple interacting processes embedded in multiple layers of contexts:
Metaphorically we are studying some feature of organizational life not as if it
represents one stream in one terrain, but more like a river basin where there may be
several streams all flowing into one another, dependent on one another for their life
and shaping and being shaped by varieties of terrain each constraining and enabling
in different intensities and ways (p. 340).
Various methods, with various degrees of rigour, have been proposed and used to trace social
mechanisms in case narratives. In general, analyses of narratives that aim to identify social
mechanisms focus on verbs that describe actions producing transformations of initial conditions
towards the observed outcomes. They also elicit the reasoning that drove actors to act in a particular
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way. Subsequently, the validity of conjectured social mechanisms is confirmed with methods such as
network analyses, discourse analyses, and comparative case studies (McAdam et al., 2008).
To trace mechanisms contributing to the successful implementation of information systems by
medical professionals in the context of a hospital, Goh, Gao, and Agarwal (2011) conducted a
narrative network analysis as suggested by Pentland and Feldman (2007). Buttriss and Wilkinson
(2006) outline a number of methods they used for tracing social mechanisms in a case describing
the internationalization of a company in the electronic components industry. They include the
tracing backwards in time of the chains of actions and conditions that led to the internationalization
outcome, the identification of concurrent actions that converged to the eventual outcome and of
those actions that produced divergent paths of events, and the identification of processes of actions
with cumulative and feedback effects.
In all these examples, the tracing of social mechanisms involves inductive methods, such as
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, accounts of methods in research descriptions
may misleadingly present the generation of causal propositions as a merely data-driven effort for the
identification of social mechanisms. As I argue in this paper, empirical investigation is not devoid of
theoretical influence, and, in process research, the construction of conceptual propositions about
social mechanisms that explain observed outcomes is not separated from their testing (Suddaby,
2006). Ultimately, causal explanations are accounts of concealed processes, which are only indirectly
observable from their outcomes, and their tracing requires the researcher’s ―disciplined imagination‖
(Weick, 1989) and intuitive leaps.

5. Developing Social Mechanism Explanations in Social Theory IS
Research
I suggest that the IS research stream that draws from social theory can produce more complete and
novel explanations of IS phenomena by altering its epistemic script to include the tracing of social
mechanisms. The main components of this approach are as follows:
a) Identification of an IS phenomenon of interest, the explanation of which is the research
goal. Although research focuses on the specificities of case studies, the object of
explanatory theory should be a phenomenon recognizable as occurring in more than
one contexts.
b) Conceptual framing of the IS phenomenon of interest as an object of research by
drawing from general social theories of action and technology, such as theories of
practice. Such framing comprises fundamental assumptions on how socio-technical
change happens, according to which the entities, relationships, and processes under
study are conceptually identified.
c) Tracing of social mechanisms in case narratives of events, actions, and interactions
that produce observed outcomes of the phenomenon under study. While carried out in
a theoretical framing, the search for social mechanisms should seek to unravel, in
analyses of empirical data from one or multiple cases, causal paths of conditions,
actions, and events that generate the observed outcomes.
The resulting theory will most likely comprise several social mechanisms interwoven in broader
processes that bring about the phenomenon under study and its outcomes. Some of the social
mechanisms may indeed be refinements or adjustments of the core concepts of the underpinning
social theory, while others may be additional new, phenomenon-specific, concepts.
Explanation by social mechanisms adds two main strengths to social theory IS research. First, social
mechanisms make explicit the causal paths that produce outcomes of IS phenomena, and thus,
according to the epistemology of explanation, makes better explanatory theory. Second, being
empirically driven, the tracing of social mechanisms is likely to produce new insights beyond those
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implied by the theories that frame the research, and therefore to contribute more complete, multicausal explanation. Still, social mechanisms-based process theory needs to be understood as an
incomplete and indeterminate form of causal explanation. Social mechanisms are neither sufficient to
fully explain an observed outcome, nor necessarily present in all occurrences of the same
phenomenon. This may appear weak compared to explanatory theory in the natural sciences, but
explanation by social mechanisms is arguably the only type of explanation suitable for social and
socio-technical phenomena (Giddens, 1984).
A major practical challenge in the suggested approach is related to the difficulty of conducting and
presenting process research that makes sense of and constructs arguments from masses of
unstructured data (Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Pettigrew, 1997). The researcher needs a method
for tracing social mechanisms that will bring adequate rigour to the research process without stifling
imagination and creativity. Such methods hardly exist at present, and need to be developed.
The explanatory power of the resulting theory would be judged differently by positivist and nonpositivist researchers and reviewers. For positivists, the indeterminacy and non-falsifiability of
explanation in the form of social mechanisms are serious shortcomings. Some non-positivists would
find making explicit causal claims undesirable. Social mechanism explanation may be more
conducive to functionalist explanation rather than making sense of emerging meanings. Goh et al.’s
(2011) research shows that social mechanism explanation can accommodate both the functional and
the symbolic, but it may indeed be easier to trace social mechanisms related to functions than to
meanings and interpretations that bring about social phenomena.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, I create awareness about the importance of causality in explanatory research, and I
point to social mechanisms as components of causal process theory. I examine in some detail the
explanatory capacity of IS research that draws from social theory, and suggest that such research
can produce more powerful theory if it develops causal explanation in the form of social
mechanisms. ―More powerful‖ in this context means multi-causal process theory that reveals
relationships that generate IS phenomena. Such an approach can produce more c omplete
explanations than the prominent pattern that seeks to understand IS phenomena by refining
general socio-theoretical concepts. It can develop new theoretical explanations beyond those
implied by the concepts of the framing general theories by empirically eliciting the unfolding of
causal processes that bring about IS phenomena.
It will take, of course, more than the IS researchers’ awareness of the importance of causality to
shift the epistemic script of socio-theoretical IS research towards the search for social mechanisms.
Reviewers’ recognition of the desirability and legitimacy of process research that is explicitly causal
is as important as researchers’ willingness to form phenomenon-specific theories in the form of
multi-causal explanations.
Social theory publications form a relatively small proportion of the IS literature, and this publication
space has been achieved gradually with the establishment of principles that have made interpretive
process research credible in the IS community. As I mention above, process research is considered a
difficult approach to constructing convincing arguments that can be presented in the limited space of
a journal article. Authors and reviewers often seek legitimacy by reference to publications that set the
criteria of good interpretive research. This may facilitate publication, but it creates a path dependence
that stifles the development of new research approaches such as identifying social mechanisms.
Senior editors can play a vital leaders’ role in shifting the epistemic script of this research stream to
allow for the introduction of research approaches with more explanatory power.
The construction of social mechanisms explanation may gain recognition more easily in research of
emerging phenomena of IS innovation for which there is not an established research pattern. As the
Internet is creatively intertwined with new areas of social activity and as IS researchers are
confronted with an range of still poorly understood phenomena, research will need to increase its
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capacity for phenomenon-specific, empirically-driven explanatory theory building. General theoretical
perspectives are indispensible to guide researchers, and it makes better research if they are explicitly
stated in the framing of the research object. Yet the onus for the social theory IS research community
is to develop research practices to explain the outcomes of this relentless innovation by uncovering
phenomenon-specific causal paths of socio-technical interaction.
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